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 21 
Abstract 22 
Background:  The U.S. opioid epidemic has caused substantial harm for over 20 years.  Policy 23 
interventions have had limited impact and sometimes backfired.  Experts recommend a systems 24 
modeling approach to address the complexities of opioid policymaking. 25 
Objectives:  Develop a system dynamics simulation model that reflects the complexities and can 26 
anticipate intended and unintended intervention effects.   27 
Methods:  The model was developed from literature review and data gathering.  Its outputs, 28 
starting 1990, were compared against 12 historical time series.  Illustrative interventions were 29 
simulated for 2020-2030:  reducing prescription dosage by 20%, cutting diversion by 30%, 30 
increasing addiction treatment from 45% to 65%, and increasing lay naloxone use from 4% to 31 
20%.  Sensitivity testing was performed to determine effects of uncertainties. No human 32 
subjects were studied. 33 
Results:  The model fits historical data well with error percentage averaging 9% across 201 data 34 
points.  Interventions to reduce dosage and diversion reduce the number of persons with 35 
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opioid use disorder (PWOUD) by 11% and 16%, respectively, but each reduces overdoses by 36 
only 1%.  Boosting treatment reduces overdoses by 3% but increases PWOUD by 1%.  37 
Expanding naloxone reduces overdose deaths by 12% but increases PWOUD by 2% and 38 
overdoses by 3%.  Combining all four interventions reduces PWOUD by 24%, overdoses by 4%, 39 
and deaths by 18%.  Uncertainties may affect these numerical results, but policy findings are 40 
unchanged. 41 
Conclusion:  No single intervention significantly reduces both PWOUD and overdose deaths, but 42 
a combination strategy can do so.  Entering the 2020s, only protective measures like naloxone 43 
expansion could significantly reduce overdose deaths.   44 
 45 
Background and Purpose 46 
The epidemic of opioid abuse in the United States started in the late 1990s and is still unabated.  47 
The story is well-known: excessive prescriptions, followed by diversion to a black market, 48 
growing addiction, the shift to heroin, and then the ravages of deadly illicit fentanyl (1-4).  The 49 
number of persons with opioid use disorder (PWOUD) tripled from 1995 to 2010, rising to more 50 
than 2 million (5); and since then has remained stubbornly at that level despite addiction 51 
treatment more than tripling from 2003 to 2015 (6).  The number of opioid overdose deaths 52 
rose from about 8,000 in 1999, to 21,000 in 2010, to 49,000 in 2017 (7).  Hundreds of 53 
thousands have lost their lives to the epidemic, and the estimated economic costs of opioid 54 
addiction and death are nearly $100 billion per year (8-9). 55 
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A variety of policy interventions have been proposed to address the epidemic.  These include 56 
efforts to control opioid prescribing and dosage strength, to control diversion, to expand and 57 
improve addiction treatment, and to reduce overdose deaths and other harms (1).  Past 58 
intervention efforts have had limited success and have sometimes backfired.  One example is 59 
the introduction of tamper-resistant OxyContin in 2010, which did reduce abuse of that drug 60 
but also caused many PWOUD to switch from prescription opioids to heroin (10)—a risky switch 61 
given the later widespread fentanyl contamination of heroin.  Similarly, there is a concern that 62 
efforts to limit prescription and diversion of legal opioids might leave street users more 63 
vulnerable to dangerous counterfeit fentanyl pills (1).  Even the “obvious” policy of expanding 64 
naloxone distribution to reduce overdose deaths has been questioned by some, because it 65 
might encourage more opioid abuse (11, 12).                     66 
A committee of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine has 67 
recommended that a systems modeling approach be taken to deal with such complexities and 68 
policy uncertainties (1).  Their report cited modeling work by Wakeland and colleagues (13-14) 69 
as a first step in that direction.  Other opioid systems frameworks and models have also been 70 
presented recently (15-18). 71 
Here we present a new systems model at the U.S. national level that uses the same system 72 
dynamics simulation methodology as the original Wakeland work (which traced the epidemic 73 
through 2011) but updates and extends beyond the scope of the older model.  For example, the 74 
new model includes the effects of fentanyl in the black markets for prescription opioids and 75 
heroin.  It can be used to evaluate a wide variety of policy interventions, quantifying their 76 
intended and unintended consequences over time.  We first describe the model’s basic 77 
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structure and outputs, and then describe the results of illustrative intervention testing using the 78 
model.  79 
Methods  80 
(An IRB consent process/ethics committee is not applicable. This study did not involve human 81 
subjects.) 82 
Model Description 83 
1. System dynamics (SD) modeling  84 
System dynamics was developed in the 1950s and is used to study complex issues of business 85 
strategy and public policy.  An SD model consists of interlinked differential equations, linear and 86 
nonlinear algebraic relationships, and input assumptions.  It produces outputs that replicate 87 
historical trajectories and projects them into the future, along with the impacts of potential 88 
interventions and uncertainties.  The approach has been applied to many population health and 89 
drug abuse issues (19-22). 90 
SD models typically divide populations of interest into separate compartments or stocks, 91 
detailing the flows that go into, between, and out of the stocks.   92 
SD models also include behavioral feedback loops that can cause annual flow rates (also called 93 
transition rates) to change predictably over time rather than remaining fixed.  For example, 94 
new initiates to opioid non-medical use might initially be attracted by the presence of plentiful 95 
availability on the street; but a large increase in the number of non-medical users might 96 
subsequently cause street availability to diminish, thus limiting further initiation.   97 
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The inclusion of such feedback loops distinguishes fully realized SD models from less elaborate 98 
model types that assume fixed or exogenous transition rates.  Such simpler models have been 99 
used for studying the opioid epidemic (15-16); but without explicit feedback loops, they cannot 100 
systematically anticipate the dynamic consequences of potential interventions. 101 
2. Model development and overview 102 
We followed established procedures for SD model development (19).  This involved first 103 
updating our understanding of the epidemic (beyond the original Wakeland work) based on the 104 
latest reports and analysis, including studies of recent trends.  From these studies, as well as 105 
our own analysis of several online datasets, we developed longitudinal time series starting from 106 
as far back as 1990 to the present (24-47).  We then developed, through multiple iterations, a 107 
dynamic structure (involving stocks, flows, feedback loops, and external factors) capable of 108 
explaining the historical trends.  We also did extensive sensitivity testing (see online Appendix) 109 
to determine what effect uncertainties might have on model outputs looking as much as a 110 
decade into the future. 111 
This process resulted in a model (comprising 8 stocks, some 200 algebraic variables, and some 112 
80 input parameters) that conforms with the literature, reproduces a variety of national-level 113 
historical trends, and is fit for policy analysis.  The model was implemented using VensimTM 114 
(version 7.3.5), a standard for advanced SD modeling.  Full details of the model’s structure, 115 
equations, and input parameters are presented elsewhere (23).  Figure 1 presents an overview 116 
of the model’s causal structure.  Table 1 lists variables for which we assembled longitudinal 117 
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historical data, including 8 time series used to calibrate model inputs and 12 time series against 118 
which model outputs are compared. 119 
<Figure 1 goes about here> 120 
<Table 1 goes about here> 121 
At the heart of the model are non-medical users (NMUs) of opioids, subdivided into six 122 
mutually exclusive stocks defined by two dimensions, the first of which is drug type used: 123 
during any given year, some NMUs use prescription opioids (PO) but not heroin, some use 124 
heroin but not PO, and some use both PO and heroin.  The second dimension is the presence or 125 
absence of opioid use disorder (OUD).      126 
Associated with the six NMU stocks are 30 inflows, outflows, and interconnecting flows.  These 127 
fall into five categories: flows of initiation, becoming addicted, shifting among drug type used 128 
(PO and/or heroin), quitting (abstinent for a year), and death (from overdose and all other 129 
causes).   130 
3. PO non-medical use initiation, addiction, and quitting 131 
One source of PO NMU initiation and addiction is from medical users, those who have scripts 132 
and initially use as directed.  The number of medical users is modeled based on the number of 133 
PO scripts written per month.  PO script volume is modeled exogenously reflecting historical 134 
values (see Table 1) and projected forward based on population growth and aging; one may 135 
also simulate a future policy intervention to reduce script volume.  136 
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Medical users of PO may transition to non-medical use (OUD or non-OUD).  But only a minority 137 
of new PO NMUs have their own script (39, 44), the great majority being “street” initiates who 138 
use diverted PO that is shared or obtained on the black market.   139 
Street initiates to PO grew from 1990 to the early 2000s, before starting a long and uneven 140 
decline.  The growth likely occurred for two reasons: first, the snowball effect of social 141 
diffusion; and second, a gradual increase in PO availability (and decrease in price) on the street.  142 
The decline likely occurred initially because of the fear of overdose: PO NMU overdose deaths 143 
nearly tripled from 1999 to 2011 (47).  The decline in PO initiation after 2010 was also likely due 144 
to availability disruptions (14, 39; and discussed below).  Both availability and fear are well-145 
known factors affecting illicit drug initiation (21, 48).   146 
The likelihood of medical users becoming addicted (transitioning to OUD) increases with higher 147 
prescribed dose strengths (measured in milligrams of morphine equivalent or MME) (49).  148 
Average dose strength (as a proxy for the entire distribution of different dose strengths being 149 
prescribed) is modeled exogenously to reproduce the historical MME trend (28-29); one may 150 
also simulate a future policy intervention to reduce average prescribed dose strength. 151 
The more common path to PO OUD, rather than from medical use, is through escalation from 152 
non-OUD street use.  If the relative availability of diverted PO were to grow, the risk of 153 
escalation would also increase, because greater accessibility tends to boost frequency of use 154 
(13, 50).  155 
Our model-based analysis of the historical data suggests that the factors of fear and availability 156 
that affected PO initiation also affected rates of quitting among PO NMUs.  Another factor 157 
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affecting quitting is medication-assisted treatment (MAT).  MAT can boost the likelihood of a 158 
PWOUD quitting by a factor of 2 or more.  MAT also reduces the frequency of street use and 159 
the risk of overdose (51-52).  The fraction of PWOUD receiving MAT (at some point during the 160 
year) more than doubled during 2003-2016, rising from less than 20% to more than 40% (5-6, 161 
29).  One may simulate a future policy intervention to further increase the fraction of PWOUD 162 
receiving MAT.  163 
4. PO street availability, price, and diversion 164 
PO relative street availability is modeled through a pair of stocks, one representing all apparent 165 
PO on the street (both authentic and counterfeit) and the other representing only counterfeit 166 
(fentanyl) pills; these stocks are measured in actual or apparent MME.  These stocks have 167 
inflows of newly diverted PO and newly arriving counterfeit pills.  They have outflows of street 168 
demand or consumption, driven by the number of PO NMUs (OUD as well as non-OUD).  PO 169 
relative availability on the street is the ratio of the combined stock to current street demand.   170 
Street availability per se is not tracked in real life, but a closely related measure is average 171 
street price.  (We model average PO street price per MME as an inverse function of relative 172 
availability.)  Large, mostly reliable samples of PO street prices may be found at crowdsourcing 173 
websites such as StreetRx.com and Bluelight.org (45-46, 53).  These data suggest that PO street 174 
price generally decreased from 2007 to 2018, except for a large upward spike during 2011-175 
2013.   176 
In order to approximate this pattern in the model, we allow the diverted fraction of PO to vary 177 
over time, in two ways.  First, we assume the existence of a balancing feedback loop, reflecting 178 
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a profit motive for suppliers (50), in which low current street availability (thus, higher street 179 
price) spurs more diversion, while high current availability (lower price) inhibits further 180 
diversion.   181 
Second, we assume that interventions had the effect of reducing diversion and street 182 
availability during the period 2011-2013, causing the price to spike during those years.  One was 183 
the introduction of tamper-resistant OxyContin in late 2010 (1, 10).  The other was a crackdown 184 
on “pill mills” (for example, in Florida and Texas) that dole out large quantities of PO based on 185 
fraudulent scripts (54-55).  These control efforts had mostly run their course by 2014.  One 186 
may, however, simulate other possible future efforts to control diversion.   187 
5. Heroin initiation, addiction, and quitting  188 
We model two routes of initiation to heroin: from prior PO NMU and not.  Since the National 189 
Survey on Drug Abuse and Health (NSDUH) first starting tracking this in 2000, most new heroin 190 
users (OUD and non-OUD) have come from prior PO NMU as opposed to coming directly to 191 
heroin (3, 44).   192 
The historical pattern of heroin initiation was uneven growth from 1990 through the early 193 
2010s followed by decline.  The growth through 2010 likely reflects a few factors: social 194 
diffusion; the steady decline in heroin price (33-35); and the growth (during 2002-2011) in the 195 
non-oral abuse of PO (injecting or inhaling, which typically precede the transition from PO to 196 
heroin) (31-32, 56).  Further growth in heroin initiation during 2011-2013 reflects the upward 197 
spike in PO price that occurred during those years (45-46), relative to a heroin price that was 198 
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continuing to decline (10).  We model heroin price as an exogenous time series that can be 199 
modified when testing future scenarios.  200 
The rapid decline in heroin initiation seen in the data since 2014 likely reflects fear of overdose; 201 
heroin user overdoses grew dramatically during this recent period largely due to contamination 202 
of street heroin by illicit fentanyl (4, 47). 203 
We model two routes of becoming a heroin user with OUD: from prior PO OUD (the more 204 
common route) and through escalation from non-OUD heroin use.  NSDUH data for 2000-2014 205 
indicate that 50-63% of heroin users have OUD (44).    206 
Treatment (MAT) affects the rate of quitting for heroin addicts.  However, MAT is about 20% 207 
less effective at generating quits in persons with heroin OUD than in persons with PO OUD (57).  208 
6. Opioid overdoses and overdose deaths 209 
Heroin users and persons with PO OUD using non-orally (injecting and inhaling) are at a risk of 210 
overdosing twice or more that of persons with PO OUD using orally (58) and, we estimate, 20-211 
25 times that of non-OUD PO NMUs.  Risks for all opioid NMUs (both PO and heroin users) 212 
increased after 2013 due to the rise of illicit fentanyl (and even more dangerous analogs such as 213 
carfentanil), resulting in a doubling of annual opioid overdose deaths from 2013 to 2017 (4, 47).  214 
Recent data suggest that, since 2017, the growth in opioid overdose deaths has finally slowed 215 
and perhaps peaked (59, 60).    216 
For PO NMUs, the illicit fentanyl risk is from look-alike counterfeit pills, and this risk is 217 
calculated in the model by comparing the simulated stock of such counterfeits to the total stock 218 
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of PO available on the street.  For heroin users, the risk is from fentanyl powder that looks 219 
identical to heroin.  We model the influx of fentanyl pills and fentanyl powder as exogenous 220 
time series that can be modified when testing future scenarios.  221 
Most overdose deaths occur at home or otherwise outside a medical facility; this fraction 222 
increased during 1999-2015 from 65% to 73% (61).  Laypersons thus have a key role to play in 223 
administering naloxone to reverse overdoses, and it has been demonstrated that they can do 224 
so effectively (62-63).  An increasing number of public health departments, pharmacies, and 225 
other organizations provide naloxone kits to laypersons. More than 26,000 opioid overdose 226 
reversals were reported through mid-2014 by such organizations and more than 8,000 in 2013 227 
alone (64).  We estimate that this represented only about 3% of the potential opportunity for 228 
naloxone reversal by laypersons in 2013, and perhaps 4% by 2017.  One may simulate a future 229 
policy intervention to increase the lay use of naloxone. 230 
 231 
Model Testing and Results 232 
Baseline simulation 1990-2030 233 
We performed a baseline (or “status quo”) simulation from 1990 to 2030 assuming no further 234 
changes beyond 2020 in any of the model’s external inputs other than population growth and 235 
aging per Census projections (24).  This includes no further decline in the per-capita (and age-236 
standardized) opioid prescription rate, which relative to the 1995 level (=1.0) had risen to 1.75 237 
by 2010 but was down to 1.3 by 2017 and still falling (27).  It also includes no further decrease 238 
after 2020 in the average MME dosage prescribed, nor in the price of heroin; and no further 239 
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increase in the non-oral fraction of PO non-medical use, nor in the influx of fentanyl, nor in the 240 
MAT fraction of PWOUD, nor in lay naloxone usage.   241 
Figure 2 presents time graphs for 12 outputs from the baseline run and comparisons with 242 
historical data.  The fit to history is quantified in Table 1 in terms of the mean absolute error as 243 
a percentage of the mean (MAEM), a commonly used metric for such comparisons (19).  The 244 
MAEM is less than 18% for all 12 output variables and averages 9% across the 201 data points 245 
they encompass.  This may be considered good model performance, especially because some of 246 
the survey data are erratic, including data for heroin users, PO and heroin initiation, and PO 247 
street price. 248 
<Figure 2 goes about here> 249 
Under the status quo assumptions, the model projects flattening in the number of PO NMUs 250 
after 2020, continued gradual decline in persons with PO OUD (Figure 2 panel A), and a decline 251 
in heroin users (panel B) reversing the rapid growth of 2005-2015.  These patterns reflect low 252 
rates of initiation (panel C) due to continued fear of overdosing; as well as fewer persons with 253 
PO OUD transitioning to heroin (panels C and D) due to lower simulated PO street price.  The 254 
lower simulated PO street price (panel E), in turn, reflects less consumption demand due to 255 
fewer persons with PO OUD, thus greater relative availability on the street.    256 
Overdose deaths decline gradually after 2020 (panel F) reflecting the decline in PWOUD.  But 257 
fentanyl remains a scourge, responsible for a great majority of overdose deaths in heroin users, 258 
as well as more than 50% of overdose deaths in PO NMUs by the early 2020s.  The latter 259 
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reflects the greater exposure of PO NMUs to counterfeit pills as the street supply of authentic 260 
(diverted) PO declines, reflecting a gradual decline in diversion as PO street demand softens. 261 
Note that the baseline projections of our model are in some cases different from the 262 
projections of other previous models (15-16).  The other models agree that the prevalence of 263 
PO non-medical use is on a steady decline, but whereas we project a decline in heroin use they 264 
project a continued increase.  Likewise, whereas we project a decline in opioid overdose deaths 265 
during the 2020s, they project a continued increase.  The apparent peaking in recent overdose 266 
deaths data (59-60) may call into question these projections of continued growth made by 267 
other models.                  268 
Intervention tests 2020-2030 269 
Table 2 presents four categories of intervention that can be tested using the model, along with 270 
real-world examples of each.  These intervention strategies and tactics have been described by 271 
the National Academies committee and other policy analysts (1, 15, 65-69).  Of the 11 272 
consensus recommendations in the National Academies report, the only ones that do not fall 273 
into one of our four categories are behavioral counseling of pain patients to prevent addiction, 274 
and syringe exchanges to reduce disease transmission (1). 275 
<Table 2 goes about here> 276 
We have experimented with various plausible magnitudes of intervention, as well as 277 
combinations of interventions.  Here we consider 5 illustrative tests, all implemented starting in 278 
2020 and maintained through the end of the simulation in 2030: 279 
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1. Reduce the average prescribed opioid MME dose by 20%.  (We estimate this would 280 
reduce average dose to its 2002 value, and 28% below its 2011 peak.) 281 
2. Cut PO diversion by 30%.  (This would be stronger than the diversion control efforts of 282 
2011-2013 which we estimate cut diversion temporarily by 20%.) 283 
3. Increase the fraction of addicts receiving MAT from its baseline 45% to 65%.  (This 284 
would likely require improved insurance coverage for office-based MAT [66-69].)    285 
4. Increase naloxone use by laypersons (for overdoses not treated in medical facilities) 286 
from its baseline 4% to 20%.  (Lay naloxone use expanded six-fold from 2010 to 2015 287 
[64]; here we consider another five-fold expansion, perhaps through multiple strategies 288 
[65].) 289 
5. Combine the above four interventions. 290 
Table 3 presents simulated outcomes under these interventions (and the baseline run for 291 
comparison) in the year 2030 for three variables: persons with OUD (PWOUD), opioid 292 
overdoses seen at hospital emergency departments, and opioid overdose deaths.  These are 293 
variables for which we have baseline data (see Table 1) and are the three variables in the model 294 
that in real life most directly indicate the burden of opioid abuse (8-9).  We have also produced 295 
graphs showing a variety of outcome variables as they change continuously over time from 296 
2020 to 2030 (see online Appendix).  With these outputs, we can tell the following story about 297 
each simulation relative to the baseline run:    298 
<Table 3 goes about here> 299 
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Reduce average dose by 20%:  Medical user addiction is reduced, as is PO street supply 300 
(thus boosting PO street price).  The increase in PO street price pushes more PO NMUs into 301 
heroin use.  Also, the reduction in authentic PO on the street exposes more PO NMUs to 302 
counterfeit pills.  As a result, overdoses from authentic PO decline, while heroin and fentanyl 303 
overdoses increase.  These impacts are mostly complete by 2026.  By 2030, PWOUD are 304 
reduced 11%, but total opioid overdoses and deaths are reduced by only 1%.  305 
Cut PO diversion by 30%:  Although this intervention does not affect medical user addiction, 306 
it otherwise has consequences like those of the previous intervention.  It more strongly reduces 307 
persons with PO OUD but also more strongly boosts heroin users.  By 2030, PWOUD are 308 
reduced 16%, but total overdoses and deaths are reduced by only 1%. 309 
Increase MAT to 65%:  This intervention nicely reduces overdoses and deaths within the 310 
first year of implementation, but its longer-term effects are more modest.  Most treated 311 
PWOUD do not become permanent abstainers, but their frequency of street use is reduced (51-312 
52). Less frequent PO use means less street demand, resulting in an increase in street 313 
availability—which attracts more PO NMUs.  As a result, though MAT reduces persons with 314 
heroin OUD, persons with PO OUD increase, enough to cause a net 1% increase in total PWOUD 315 
by 2030.  With persons with PO OUD up and persons with heroin OUD down, total overdoses 316 
and deaths end up being reduced by a net 3% by 2030.  317 
Increase lay naloxone use to 20%:  This intervention immediately reduces overdose deaths.  318 
It does allow PWOUD to stay alive longer and is the only intervention we have tested that leads 319 
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to some increase in the number of overdoses.  By 2030, overdose deaths are down 12% relative 320 
to the baseline, but PWOUD are up 2% and total overdoses by 3%.   321 
Combine the four interventions:  Combining the four interventions reduces PWOUD by 24%, 322 
overdoses by 4%, and deaths by 18% by 2030.  This is approximately what one would get from 323 
simply summing the individual intervention impacts, an indication that the interventions are 324 
complementary rather than mutually interfering or redundant.   325 
 326 
Sensitivity testing of intervention findings 327 
We have tested the sensitivity of intervention findings to two types of uncertainty (see online 328 
Appendix).  The first is uncertainty regarding some 50 of the model’s input constants.  To 329 
address this uncertainty, we have performed extensive Monte Carlo testing, identified 330 
hundreds of “qualifying parameter sets” based on fit-to-history, and then tested the 331 
interventions against each of these parameter sets (70).  We have determined that the model’s 332 
policy findings are unaffected by uncertainty of constants, although the numerical results may 333 
change somewhat.   334 
We have also tested against future uncertainty in exogenous inputs (aside from interventions), 335 
including future non-oral use of PO, heroin price, and influxes of fentanyl powder and 336 
counterfeit pills.  We find that the basic policy findings are unaffected by this type of 337 
uncertainty as well.  338 
 339 
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Conclusion 340 
The opioid epidemic is complex and warrants a systems modeling approach.  The significance of 341 
the model presented here is that it includes behavioral feedback loops and has greater breadth 342 
than other models to date, reproduces the epidemic’s entire history along several interacting 343 
dimensions, and demonstrates both intended and unintended consequences of policy 344 
intervention. 345 
Model testing indicates that no single intervention significantly reduces both persons with OUD 346 
and overdose deaths, but this can be accomplished by a combination strategy.  At this 347 
advanced stage of the opioid epidemic, entering the 2020s, only protective measures like 348 
naloxone expansion (or perhaps European-style drug checking services (71)) could significantly 349 
reduce overdose deaths.     350 
The model’s policy findings are insensitive to uncertainties in inputs, a sign of its robustness.  351 
However, it is still a simplified version of reality subject to improvement as are all models.  For 352 
example, in modeling the fear of overdose, we have assumed that fatal and nonfatal overdoses 353 
are perceived as equally frightening.  Such was the conclusion of a previous study (21), but 354 
perhaps this assumption should be explored further, as it could affect conclusions about the 355 
impact of naloxone expansion.  Other possible improvements include greater detail in our 356 
depictions of medical use, diversion, street supply, and treatment, as well as more detailed 357 
policy analyses.   358 
 359 
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 586 
Figure 1.  Model overview diagram 587 
(Rectangle=stock variable; Thick arrow with valve symbol=flow variable; Circle=other calculated 588 
variable; Blue text=intervention input variable; Brown text=other input variable; Blue arrow= 589 
causal link with positive polarity; Red arrow with minus sign=causal link with negative polarity; 590 
PO=prescription opioids; NMU=non-medical users; OUD=opioid use disorder; MME=milligrams 591 
morphine equivalent; MAT=medication-assisted treatment.)    592 
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Table 1.  Longitudinal data sources and baseline run fit to history in terms of mean absolute 593 
error as percentage of historical mean (MAEM %) 594 
 595 
Key to dataset acronyms: 596 
NPA: National Prescription Audit (IQVIA, Inc.) 597 
ARCOS: Automated Reports and Consolidated Ordering System (DEA) 598 
N-SSATS: National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (SAMHSA) 599 
TEDS: Treatment Episode Data Set (SAMHSA) 600 
STRIDE: System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (DEA) 601 
NFLIS: National Forensic Laboratory Information System (DEA) 602 
NHAMCS: National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (CDC) 603 
NSDUH: National Survey of Drug Use and Health (SAMHSA) 604 
WONDER: Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (CDC)   605 
606 
Variable Datasets and Sources Year range
# of data 
points MAEM %
US population ages 20-39, 40-59, 60+ US Census tables (24-25) 1990-2030 15
PO scripts IQVIA NPA/Xponent (26-27) 1992-2017 26
PO script morphine mg. equiv. (MME) ARCOS (28-30) 1994-2018 25
Persons with OUD treated N-SSATS, ARCOS (6, 29) 2003-2016 14
% PO OUD who use non-orally TEDS (31-32) 1994-2014 21
Avg heroin street price per pure mg STRIDE (33-35) 1993-2016 22
Illicit fentanyl trend (quantity seized) NFLIS (36-37) 2001-2017 17
ED visits for opioid overdose NHAMCS (38) 1993-2010 9
PO total NMUs NSDUH (13, 39-40) 1995-2018 24 6.4%
PO NMUs with OUD NSDUH (5, 13, 39-41) 2000-2017 18 9.0%
PO NMU initiates NSDUH (13, 38, 42-43) 1990-2018 27 10.3%
Heroin total users NSDUH (39-41, 44) 1990-2018 19 12.4%
Heroin addicted users NSDUH (40-41, 44) 2000-2014 14 9.0%
Heroin initiates NSDUH (39) 2002-2018 17 17.8%
% Heroin users also PO NMU NSDUH (44) 1990-2016 7 13.9%
% Heroin initiates previously PO NMU NSDUH (3, 44) 2000-2016 8 10.1%
Avg PO street price per MME StreetRx, Bluelight (30, 45-46) 2007-2018 12 17.9%
OD deaths from PO WONDER (47) 1999-2016 18 5.2%
OD deaths from illicit opioids WONDER (47) 1999-2016 18 3.5%
OD deaths total WONDER (47) 1999-2017 19 3.7%
Data used for calibration of model inputs
(not 
applicable)
Data used for comparison of model outputs with history
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Avg street price PO vs data and H price
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Figure 2.  Model outputs compared with historical data and projected under baseline 642 
assumptions to 2030 643 
(a) PO nonmedical users, total and OUD; (b) Heroin users, total and OUD;  644 
(c) New initiates to PO nonmedical use and heroin use; (d) Fractions of heroin users and heroin 645 
initiates who are also PO NMUs; (e) Average PO and heroin street prices per MME;              646 
(f) Overdose deaths from prescription opioids, illicit opioids, and all opioids  647 
  648 
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Table 2.  Intervention categories and examples 649 
 650 
  651 
Intervention category Examples
Provider education
Prescription guidelines
Electronic decision support
Prescription drug monitoring programs
Prescription drug rescheduling (to reduce refills)
Patient and public education
Abuse-deterrent formulations
Rx drug take-back programs
Law enforcement crackdowns
Improve insurance coverage of MAT
Mandate MAT access in hospitals, prisons, and 
substance abuse programs
Mandate MAT training for medical providers
Expand psychosocial supports for treated addicts
Refer patients to MAT after ED overdose rescue
Naloxone laws and subsidies facilitating distribution 
through pharmacies and medical providers
Naloxone training for first responders and laypersons
Laws allowing supervised injection facilities
Laws allowing drug checking (for adulteration and 
counterfeits)
Efforts to reduce risks of deadly 
overdose
Efforts to control PO prescribing & 
dosage strength
Efforts to control diversion
Efforts to expand and improve 
addiction treatment
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 652 
Table 3.  Intervention testing outcomes as of 2030 653 
 654 
 655 
 656 
 657 
Simulation
Persons 
with OUD  
(thou.)
Overdoses 
seen at ED
Overdose 
deaths
Persons 
with OUD
Overdoses 
seen at ED
Overdose 
deaths
Baseline 1,694 154,710 40,323
Avg MME dose down 20% 1,510 152,686 39,796 -10.9% -1.3% -1.3%
Diversion control 30% 1,428 153,076 39,897 -15.7% -1.1% -1.1%
Treatment rate 65% (from 45%) 1,713 150,095 39,120 1.1% -3.0% -3.0%
Naloxone lay use 20% (from 4%) 1,728 159,228 35,302 2.0% 2.9% -12.5%
All 4 policies combined 1,285 148,395 32,900 -24.1% -4.1% -18.4%
Percent change from baselineSimulated results as of 2030
